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**Casualty Aversion in the Post-Cold War Era: Defined
and analyzed through the logic of Clausewitz**

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Abstract In the Post-Cold War era, the United States has found itself frequently involved in Small-Scale Contingencies. With a limited understanding of the purpose for these SSCs, Americans were unsettled by the casualties incurred. This paper defines casualty aversion as: An unwillingness by the political and military leadership to place the American military in a position of danger, even to the exclusion of accomplishing policy aims. This unwillingness is most pronounced during Small-Scale Contingencies, and can manifest itself by, strategic indecision, irresolute behavior, or indecisive application of military force. Casualty aversion is rooted in the misperceived lessons of Vietnam and has been exacerbated by failures in Beirut (1982), Somalia (1992), and Haiti (1992). Successful SSC's are characterized by strong leadership, from the President, identifying the reasons for military intervention. Clausewitz, in On War reinforces that war is a political instrument. He states that political leaders have the right and requirement to provide limitations in war. These may have adverse strategic effects by limiting the conduct of coercive statecraft. To overcome the negative aspects of casualty aversion, political leaders must provide informed, candid explanations to the American people. Military leaders must also Deemphasize body counts and precision munitions effects, while emphasizing the mission and its linkage to national policy.		
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Casualty Aversion in the Post-Cold War Era: Defined and analyzed through the logic of Clausewitz

Author: Major Robert F Wendel, USMC

Thesis: Casualty aversion is a political strategy that can impact strategic and operational decisions. Like any restraint, once understood its effect can be minimized.

Discussion:

In the Post-Cold War era, the United States has found itself frequently involved in Small-Scale Contingencies. With a limited understanding of the purpose for these SSC's, Americans were unsettled by the casualties incurred. This paper defines casualty aversion as: *"An unwillingness by the political and military leadership to place the American military in a position of danger, even to the exclusion of accomplishing policy aims. This unwillingness is most pronounced during Small-Scale Contingencies, and can manifest itself by, strategic indecision, irresolute behavior, or indecisive application of military force."*

Casualty aversion is rooted in the misperceived lessons of Vietnam and has been exacerbated by failures in Beirut (1982), Somalia (1992), and Haiti (1992). Unsuccessful SSC's have frequently been characterized by an unclear national policy aim, and consequently a disjointed or confused political and military strategy. During successful SSC's such as, Grenada (1982), Panama (1993), and Haiti (1994) the President exhibited effective leadership by providing to the American people the reasons for military intervention.

Clausewitz in On War reinforces that war is a political instrument and especially so in limited wars. He states that political leaders have both the right and requirement to provide limitations to the conduct of the war. In the Post-Cold War world, there is an increasing number of non-state actors that the United States has dealt with, the majority of these conduct themselves as if they were "nation-states". Since SSC's are on the low end of the conflict spectrum, their conduct will become more political, and military efficiency can be hampered by political limitations.

These limitations may have adverse strategic, operational, or tactical effects for the military. Diplomatically, casualty aversion can have significant impact in the ability of the nation to conduct "coercive statecraft."

Conclusion(s) or Recommendation(s):

At the strategic level, to overcome the negative aspects of casualty aversion, political leaders must provide informed, candid explanations to the American people. It is important for the politicians to remember that they should provide the military with the policy *aims* to be accomplished, not the *means* of how to do it. Over reliance on precision guided munitions and unmanned or robotic technology, although capable of reducing friendly casualties, may not achieve national policy aims as well as combat soldiers can.

At the operational level military leaders must, de-emphasize "body counts" and precision munitions effects, while emphasizing the mission and its linkage to national policy. The military leadership must provide accurate risk assessment to the political decision makers in order to allow the civilian leadership to accurately determine the cost-benefit analysis for intervention.

At the tactical level, aggressive leadership and small unit security, vice the "fortress mentality" are the keys to both accomplishing the mission and reducing casualties.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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CASUALTY AVERSION

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.¹

Clausewitz

As the United States sought to define its global strategy in the post Cold War era, it found itself embroiled in many small conflicts around the world. Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, and many others were difficult for the U.S. to identify with since they did not meet the popular American view of war as defined by the Second World War.² These limited conflicts were clearly political and complex in nature, and as such were difficult for the American people to understand and rally behind.

As U.S. forces became involved in these "small wars," casualties ensued and Dover Air Force Base became a familiar sight on the various television programs and news channels as American body bags returned home. This vision became unsettling for a public which did not fully understand the reasoning for the nation's intervention in

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, ed., On War, trans. Peter Paret, Michael Howard. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 88.

² Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, Bloomington IL: Indiana University Press, 1973. Note: This book provides a detailed examination of the "American way of War" and how both the Civil War and World War II have shaped American military thought.

PREFACE

I would like to begin by thanking Dr. Chris Harmon who figuratively "turned the light on" for me. I came into this program with strongly preconceived notions about my topic and Dr. Harmon quickly exposed to me the shallowness of my knowledge; embarrassed, I began to read. After a torturous few months of research and reflection, my analysis and conclusions reflect a significant departure from my initial beliefs.

My mentors deserve recognition for the effort they extracted from me. Dr. Donald Bittner forced me to work as hard at writing as I do at being a Marine, while Lt. Col. John Atkins continued to push the research button until my eyes bled. Without their leadership and assistance I would have probably completed the project, however the results would have been personally unacceptable.

Casualty aversion was a "hot button item" during the 1990's, whether it continues to remain so in the 21st century will remain to be seen. My personal belief is that it will remain a significant political consideration until our leaders learn that Americans will provide strong support as long as they are provided informed, candid leadership concerning the purpose of military operations. That leadership must come from not only the President, but

also from his advisors, both military and political. With the growing lack of politicians and political staffers who have served in the military, it is increasingly important that the professional officer corps provide the necessary information to its civilian "masters" in order to make informed decisions.

MOOTW, OOTW, SSC's, or LIC; whatever you call it, to the soldier on the front lines it will always be high intensity combat. There is little difference to the corporal on the ground between a major theater war and a peacekeeping operation: he is still surrounded by armed hostile men who do not like him. To this end, my hope is that the officer corps and political leadership understands the ramifications of imprudent reactions to casualty aversion. If so, then we shall always place the young officers and NCOs ordered into combat in a position from which they can be successful. The profession of arms demands that we do as much.

Major Robert Wendel USMC

[T]he Soviet Union has dissolved. The super power rivalry is no more. The stakes do not automatically go up every time the United States decides to use force. If [during the Cold War] we failed to keep our commitment, we would embolden our adversaries and cause our allies to question our commitment to them.¹

Congressman Les Aspin 1992
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

PROLOGUE

During 1993, Joint Task Force *Haiti Assistance Group* (JTF HAG) was designated to implement the Governor's Island Accords, a UN brokered peace accord, in response to unrest on the island of Haiti. On 11 October 1993 LST 1196, USS *Harlan County*, with the JTF command element and majority of JTF forces embarked, arrived of Port-au-Prince. The commander of the *Harlan County*, Commander Marvin E. Butcher Jr. USN, had been instructed that he would offload the JTF in a permissive environment. However, he was confronted with a different scene: a Cuban tanker occupied the assigned berthing space and the docks were filled with armed demonstrators. The inner port contained a significant number of small craft, some openly armed with machineguns, which posed possible threats to the lightly armed LST. After a day and a half of assessment and

¹ Les Aspin, Congressman, "Role of U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War World," address before the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, September 21, 1992.

attempted negotiations by US embassy personnel, Cmdr. Butcher determined that the environment was not permissive and left Port-au-Prince for Guantanamo Bay Cuba.² Shortly after the departure of the *Harlan County*, JTF HAG was dissolved.

The arrival of the USS Harlan County was critical because it demonstrated our commitment to the process, its departure set the scene for the unraveling of the Governor's Island process when it was on the very verge of success.

US Ambassador William Swing 1993³

The second Haitian operation

Leave now or we will force you from power.

President William J. Clinton⁴

On July 31, 1994 the United Nations adopted Resolution 940, which authorized member states to use all necessary means to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his government as the constitutional rule of Haiti. The US took the lead and planned Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The planned intervention included an airdrop with 3,900 paratroops and

² Peter Riehm, LtCmdr. USN, *The USS Harlan County Affair, Military Review*, July 1997.

³ Robert E. White, "Haiti: Policy Lost, Policy Regained", *Cosmos: A Journal of Emerging Issues*, Vol. 6, URL: www.us.net/cip/cosmos3, accessed 3 January 2001, 4.

an additional 17,000 follow on forces. With the invasion troops enroute to Haiti, President Clinton dispatched former President Jimmy Carter to negotiate from a position of strength. Backed by the UN Security Council resolution and with assault troops literally "in the air," the military junta controlling Haiti agreed to a peaceful restoration of the Aristide government.

During UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, President Clinton was able to combine the credible threat of overwhelming force with diplomatic maneuvering and the backing of world opinion to impose the Governor's Island agreement upon the Haitian military junta. The determination to use force, created a situation where combat was unnecessary.

When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives... When force is used deftly--in smooth coordination with diplomatic and economic policy---bullets may never have to fly. Pulling triggers should always be toward the end of the plan, and when those triggers are pulled all of the sound analysis I have just described should back them up.

General Colin L. Powell
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1992⁵

⁴ Robert E. White, "Haiti: Policy Lost, Policy Regained", 5.

⁵ General Colin Powell, USA, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71 No. 5, (Winter 1992/1993), 33-39.

CASUALTY AVERSION

An unwillingness by the political or military leadership to place the American military in a position of danger, even to the exclusion of accomplishing policy aims. This unwillingness is most pronounced during Small-Scale Contingencies and can manifest itself by strategic indecision, irresolute behavior, or indecisive application of military force.

(Proposed Definition)

countries where it was difficult to understand what vital interests were involved. Consequently the public began to question its involvement in these far-flung conflicts.

Eventually the media and various administrations understood this questioning as "casualty aversion" within the populace. Casualty aversion is not a new phenomenon, but it has grown in its importance in the 1990's. This paper will explore the history and effects of casualty aversion as it pertains to U.S. strategy and military intervention within small-scale contingencies³ in the Post-Cold War era.

DEFINING CASUALTY AVERSION

Casualty aversion, although frequently mentioned in news articles, has a nebulous definition. Most are extremely broad, such as *Wall Street Journal* editor Max Boot's "American people won't tolerate casualties anymore, support for the mission will evaporate as soon as the body

³ Note: Small-scale contingency was first identified by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. Although not precisely defined, SSC operations cover the full spectrum of operations short of Major Theater War (MTW). SSC's includes all MOOTW operations and combat operations against a less compelling threat than would be involved in a MTW. For example, Operation DESERT STORM was not a SSC, but Grenada, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Panama were all SSC's, regardless of the mission assigned.

bags start coming home.”⁴ This imprecise definition would lead to an unfocused study of the effects of casualty aversion on strategy and operations. There is significant debate within many sources on whether or not the American people exhibit an extreme form of casualty aversion.

To limit the scope of this paper, it is irrelevant whether the American people really subscribe to casualty aversion. The important consideration is whether the political leadership (executive branch, Congress, and major political party leadership), and senior military leadership believe the American people are casualty averse.⁵

The rationale for this assumption is that the President of the United States establishes the policies and national security strategy of the country. His policies are based on its historical ones, the current political and strategic situation, and his **perception** of what the American people believe should be done. During his process of examining the factors influencing his options during a

⁴ Max Boot, “NO-RISK WAR: Will Bush Bury ‘Bodybag Syndrome’?,” editorial, *Wall Street Journal*, September 11, 2000.

⁵ Opinion amongst researchers analyzing casualty aversion is divided on whether it truly reflects the American peoples’ will. For a more in depth discussion on the differences of opinion between the American populace, government, and military, concerning the acceptable level of casualties for specific military scenario’s see, Charles K. Hyde, “Casualty Aversion Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military Officers”, *Aerospace Power Chronicles*, (Summer2000) and Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for US Military Operations, MR-726-RC, Santa Monica CA: The Rand Corp., 1996.

crisis situation, the President will consider the nation's willpower in respect to acceptance of battlefield casualties. His perception of the American public's will is based in part on polling data, national medial coverage, and the political support he receives from the House of Representatives and Senate.

The armed forced are especially cognizant of this issue.⁶ For example, the U.S. Army's current FM 100-5 Operations clearly states, "the American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties. They... reserve the right to reconsider their support."⁷ This support generally declines as casualties and time increase, with the support declining most notably, early in a conflict.⁸

There is also confusion about what casualties the United States is averse too. During OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, American forces were extremely concerned about non-combatant casualties, while international news agencies searched for and reported upon any possible "collateral

⁶ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, General USMC (Ret), The Generals' War, Boston MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1995, 470.

⁷ Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC: Department of the Army. June 1993, 1-3.

⁸ John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1985) 266.

damage."⁹ On the other hand, Saddam Hussein tried to exploit American bombing of civilian targets during the Gulf War within the international media, however he gained little sympathy and his efforts ultimately failed.

Most of the articles researched for this paper focus on American casualties, and specifically American servicemen. To limit the scope of this paper, only U.S. service member casualties shall be considered in the context of defining casualty aversion. Excluded will be any consideration of enemy, U.S. civilian, and non-combatant casualties within a theatre of operations, since these complexities import too many variables for meaningful analysis and occasionally are the primary causative factors for the employment of the armed forces.

The last exclusion for the working definition of casualty aversion will be within the scope of the conflict. Clausewitz's statement, "the less intense the motives, the less will the military elements natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives... and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character",¹⁰ indicates that the motives (policies) directly impact the intensity exhibited by both the military and the nation as

⁹ FM 100-5, 2-3, Collateral Damage is described as unintended and undesirable civilian injuries or materiel damage adjacent to a target produced by the effects of friendly weapons.

a whole. As the policies become more political and limited in scope, there will be less public outcry for and support of direct combat. Thus political and military leaders will increasingly have to perceive the depth of the nation's support for the policies. If it is perceived to be shallow or low, the leadership can become susceptible to a belief in casualty aversion. Therefore casualty aversion will have a greater influence on strategic and operational decisionmaking as the conflict moves down the conflict spectrum from major conventional war to Military Operations other than War.

What is casualty aversion? This paper's working definition will include a "who" and a "what". Since it addresses the effects of casualty aversion on strategic and operational decisions, the who of the definition must include its effects on decision makers. Decision makers will be defined as the political and military leadership of the United States. For the what of the definition, Dr. Jeffrey Record provides perhaps the best starting point: "a desperate unwillingness to place satisfaction [mission accomplishment] of US armed intervention's political objective ahead of the safety of its military instrument".¹¹

¹⁰ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, 88.

¹¹ Jeffrey Record, "Force Protection Fetishism: Sources, Consequences, and (?) Solutions," *Aerospace Power Journal*, Summer 2000.

This statement alludes to a cost benefit analysis wherein casualties and subsequently American will power are weighed more heavily than policy objectives. This leads to my definition of casualty aversion:

An unwillingness by the political or military leadership to place the American military in a position of danger, even to the exclusion of accomplishing policy aims. This unwillingness is most pronounced during Small-Scale Contingencies, and can manifest itself by, strategic indecision, irresolute behavior, or indecisive application of military force.

WHY CASUALTY AVERSION?

The Vietnam War is frequently cited as the genesis for casualty aversion. Moreover, post Cold War political and military leadership of the United States came into adulthood during the period of Vietnam War. This conflict provided many lessons for the nation's current leadership to interpret and misinterpret. Dr. Jeffrey Record, in his critical article written in 2000 on "Force Protection Fetishism," stated his belief that:

Casualty phobia reflects a misperceived lesson of the Vietnam War that, unfortunately, is shared among some senior political and military leaders. The lesson of Vietnam (and of Lebanon and Somalia) is not the public's absolute intolerance of casualties, but an attitude toward casualties *contingent* on such reasonable criteria

as perceived strength of interests at stake and progress toward a satisfactory resolution of hostilities.¹²

This statement is supported by research conducted by Eric Larson in a 1996 RAND study.¹³ Larson concluded that the American public was not averse to casualties, but would continually conduct a cost-benefit analysis of ongoing military options to determine if the ends (probability of positive policy outcome) justify the means (American casualties). He further states, "political leaders lead the democratic conversation...[it] is observed and reported by the media, [and] as members of the public are exposed to these messages, attitudes change in a predictable fashion."¹⁴ This statement is supported by the actions of President Reagan during OPERATION URGENT FURY (Grenada 1982). During this conflict, the President provided compelling reasons to the nation for his decision to initiate combat operations. Whether the reasons were legitimate or not is irrelevant, the key to success was the President (leadership) led the public discussion and subsequently the public provided the support he desired.

¹² Jeffrey Record, "Force Protection Fetishism."

¹³ Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical role of Casualties in Domestic Support for US Military Operations, MR-726-RC, Santa Monica CA: The Rand Corp., 1976, 1-126.

¹⁴ Eric V. Larson, Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation: Understanding the role of Casualties in Support of U.S. Military Operations, (PhD diss., RAND Graduate School 1996), 267.

Larson clearly shows that American military and political leadership has misinterpreted the lessons of the Vietnam War. Instead of learning that if leaders candidly justify the policies of the government, the American people will willingly pay the price, the opposite has occurred: a significant number of U.S. leaders apparently erroneously perceived that the public did not want to see its servicemen coming home in body bags.¹⁵

This misapplication of lessons learned from the Vietnam War was exacerbated by the intervention in Beirut, Lebanon, where in October 1993, 284 U.S. Marines were killed in an attack upon their barracks. Immediately after the attack, the Marine's offensive activities were sharply curtailed and the Marine compound became an entrenched fortress to prevent future casualties. Within months of the attack, President Reagan ordered the Marines to withdraw to their ships without accomplishing their mission. His *irresolute behavior* established a precedent for future administrations to withdraw military forces after suffering setbacks.

During OPERATION DESERT SHIELD in 1990, US forces were deployed against a formidable opponent, Iraq. President

¹⁵ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor USMC (Ret), The Generals War, viii.

George H. W. Bush while simultaneously deploying US forces also began to shape U.S. public opinion to authorize the use of force to militarily support Kuwait. In so doing he explained to the nation why Kuwait was deemed a vital U.S. interest. Through his leadership, he was able to earn the support of the Congress and eventually the American people for his policies. It is significant to note that the U.S. public deemed casualty estimates ranging between 10,000 and 30,000 acceptable.¹⁶ The public did not display an aversion to high casualties since the political leadership had provided justification for the use of U.S. military force and linked it to a clearly defined national interest. As DESERT SHIELD turned from defensive to offensive operations in DESERT STORM, President Bush maintained this support. The Gulf War was a resounding success, completing its stated aim of expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait at a cost of only 293 Killed in Action.

Unfortunately for future political and military decision makers, the Gulf War brought with it yet another faulty lesson: the possible political consequences of likely combat casualties above a few hundred in a foreign

¹⁶ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E Trainor USMC (Ret), The Generals War, 133, and Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, "A look at... Casualty Aversion: How Many Deaths are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer." *Washington Post*, 7 November 1999.

intervention would be considered a grave risk.¹⁷ This was reinforced by the spectacular results of US high technology weapons that were able to attack Iraqi targets with minimal threat to US servicemembers. This war, although a tactical, operational, and strategic success, would provide future leadership with a difficult standard with which all future conflict could be compared.

Less than two years later, in December 1992, the US would be drawn into a humanitarian aid mission in Somalia. Unlike past interventions, OPERATION RESTORE HOPE started as a military intervention to assist Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) in the care and feeding of millions of victims of a civil war. Initially US forces were welcomed into Somalia, and NGO's were able to successfully provide food and medical aid to the populace under US protection. However, changing expectations caused by the shift in mission from humanitarian objectives, to nation building and warlord hunting, were combined with congressional "cues" against the operation to doom the

¹⁷ Charles Knight, Lutz Unterseher, and Carl Conetta, "Reflections on Information War, Casualty Aversion and Military Research and Development After the Gulf War and the Demise of the Soviet Union, excerpted from Military Research and Development after the Second Gulf War," in Smit, Grin, and Veronkov, Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a changing World, Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992.

intervention.¹⁸ Many researchers have reflected upon the public outcry to withdraw forces after the ill-fated raid by US Army Rangers in October 1993, which resulted in 18 dead and the graphic pictures of dead US servicemen being drug through the streets of Mogadishu. This observation misses the main point: the American people had already begun to question the policies of the Clinton Administration, with only 40 percent of Americans supporting the Somalia policy.¹⁹

Perhaps the starkest example of casualty aversion is OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. During the US led NATO campaign, in March 1999 to prevent the ethnic cleansing of ethnic Kosovar's by Serbian forces, the United States confronted the problems associated with casualty aversion. The divisions within the partisan political leadership concerning foreign policy and armed intervention led to a split opinion within the American populace.²⁰ This divided political leadership led to the President falling back on his **perception** of what the American people wanted.

Clinton's reaction was to return to Wilsonian idealism with

¹⁸ Maj, Charles K. Hyde, USAF, "Casualty Aversion Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military Officers," *Aerospace Power Chronicles*, Summer 2000.

¹⁹ Eric V. Larson, *Ends and Means*, 248.

²⁰ James Kitfield, *Neither Total War nor Total Victory*, URL: Govexec.com/dailyfed/0799/07269962, accessed 28 August 2000.

his pronouncement: "We cannot respond to such tragedies everywhere, but when ethnic conflict turns into ethnic cleansing, where we can make a difference, we must try and that is clearly the case in Kosovo."²¹ This strong statement was preceded by political realist views when on the day NATO began OPERATION ALLIED FORCE he stated: "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war."²² Eventually, the divisions within both the government and populace would force the President to believe that he could only intervene if he could keep casualties near zero. American military forces would be given restrictions on their tactics and techniques that would maximize force protection while minimizing their ability to achieve mission attainment. These restrictions were readily accepted by US military leadership, as shown by the statement of General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, NATO: "In an air campaign you don't want to lose aircraft... you start to lose these expensive machines the countdown starts against you. The headlines begin to shout, NATO loses a second aircraft, and the people ask, 'How long can this go on?'"²³

²¹ President William J Clinton, "A Just and Necessary War," *New York Times*, May 23 1999.

²² President William J. Clinton, Address to the nation, March 24 1999.

²³ Gen Wesley K. Clark, USA, "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead," *Parameters*, (Winter 1999-2000), 8-9.

Thus a point has been reached where battlefield casualty estimates have gone beyond the purview of personnel officers. These now are matters of policy debate. No longer do units have supernumerary officers allocated as immediate casualty replenishments; rather, the trend is towards limiting the number of servicemen who can go into harms way. This will minimize the ability of forces to take casualties by limiting the number of personnel who can become casualties.

Theory and Casualty Aversion

No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors; and when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean.²⁴

Carl Von Clausewitz

Clausewitz wrote his study of war between 1821 and 1827, during an age of warfare and in a society that was strikingly different than today. Yet, his thoughts still have significant relevance since casualty aversion as defined in this paper deals with both the political and military establishments, as well as concerning both ends and means in war. In Book One of On War, Clausewitz sought to define war and its relationships with politics and the

²⁴ Clausewitz, On War, 608.

state. This theory of war remains relevant today since the root factors of war, including the societal and political influences unleashed by the French Revolution, have remained the same. Only the tactics and weapons have changed.

His enduring definition of war is "that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."²⁵ Later in the book, in the chapter titled "The effect of the Political Aim on the Military Objective," Clausewitz states:

One country may support another's cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own. A moderately sized force will be sent to its help; but if things go wrong... one tries to withdraw at the smallest possible cost... the affair is more often like a business deal. In the light of the risks he expects and the dividends he hopes for.²⁶

These statements indicate that politicians can rationally consider limited war similar to a business deal, acting in a manner supported by cost-benefit analysis. Many military observers will dispute this, but consider that these passages were meant to indicate behavior during limited war. That is, those wars that can be described by the following statement: "The less intense the motives [for

²⁵ Clausewitz, On War, 87.

²⁶ Clausewitz, On War, 603.

starting the war], the less will the military element's natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course... and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character."²⁷ This statement reinforces that war is a political instrument. It is only one element among many options that can be used for a nation to enforce its will upon an opponent, just as diplomacy, negotiation, and economic force can also be utilized.

Since war is a tool for the politicians to utilize in settling national differences,²⁸ then the politicians may determine to what extent that tool (means) may be utilized or limited to accomplish national goals (ends). In his chapter on limited aims, Clausewitz introduces the idea of limited means. When war is compared to a business deal, he implies that the politicians must carefully judge the cost-benefit analysis. If the benefit is low, then the state must look to ways to decrease its cost.

The cost of a conflict can be measured through either the cost in dollars to the national treasury or the cost in

²⁷ Clausewitz, On War, 88.

²⁸ Note: One political structure that Clausewitz did not discuss was the non-state actor. Since many non-state actors have the same political motives as states, they only lack internationally recognized sovereignty; such can they be viewed as if they were states within Clausewitz's theories. Examples of such non-state actors include, Bosnian Croats & Serbs, the Palestinians (PLO), ethnic Kosovars, Kurds, etc.

lost lives to the nation. The politicians can also determine if they desire to pay the cost with either, money or lives, or money and lives. A decision to limit the waging of war with an emphasis on high-tech and long range weapons, to the exclusion of ground forces, is an example of a decision to bear the cost of war in money vice lost lives. It can therefore be seen as a completely rational process for American politicians to limit the lives they are willing to expend for a particular political gain. Therefore, within the political spectrum, the self-imposed limitation of casualties by the politicians is in keeping with Clausewitz's theory of war.

The current Secretary of State, General Colin Powell, USA (Ret), agrees with Clausewitz's analysis. His reasoning shows the fundamental political/strategic aspects of casualty avoidance. When Max Boot stated that Gen. Powell's Decisive Force doctrine caused casualty aversion,²⁹ Gen. Powell declared, "Mr. Boot is wrong."³⁰ Powell later labeled the no-casualty approach as "a political strategy used when a political judgment is made that the American people would not support the loss of their GIs for the

²⁹ Max Boot, "No-Risk War."

³⁰ General Colin Powell, USA (Ret), *Wall Street Journal*, letter to the editor, September 14, 2000. Note: This editorial was written as a rebuttal to the editorial written by *Wall Street Journal* editor Max Boot on September 11, 2000.

goals being pursued." This statement correctly identifies casualty aversion as a political phenomenon that may require constraints and restraints placed upon any military course of action considered. It further implies that the political leadership has developed a plan to "afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory, and to lessen the chances of defeat."³¹

Aside from humanitarian reasons, military commanders are usually averse to incurring needless casualties, since they reduce the forces available which can be utilized in battle. Tactical commanders are usually more concerned with the availability of forces for combat than political fallout and criticism for casualties. There is, however, a misconception with the term "excessive casualties." At no time have *excessive* casualties been acceptable, but the difference between what is acceptable and what is excessive is very different when examined through military and political perspectives. Militarily, excessive casualties are those casualties which are caused by poor commanders, bad luck, irrelevant operations, and other battlefield

³¹ Field Manual 101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A, Operational Terms and Graphics, Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1997, 1-146. Note: this is taken from the definition of "strategy".

conditions. In the political spectrum, excessive casualties refer to those casualties (no matter why they occurred), which are above and beyond those that were politically acceptable in the cost-benefit analysis. These two definitions of excessive casualties cannot be compared, since they derive from different judgmental standards and are used for different purposes.

Limitations affect friendly and enemy forces

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy³²

Sun Tzu

Understanding that the means of war can be rationally limited as a piece of political strategy, Clausewitz further states

If the political aims are small, the motives slight and tensions low, a prudent general may look for any way to avoid major crises and decisive actions... and reach a peaceful settlement... [but] he must always keep an eye on his opponent so that he does not, if the latter has taken up a sharp sword, approach him armed only with an ornamental rapier.³³

The rational decision to limit the means of a war must therefore take into account the adversary, and his actions. There can be great danger if the enemy knows the

³² Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press: London, 1963, 77.

³³ Clausewitz, On War, 99.

limitations under which a belligerent is operating. This lesson has been borne out in various statements by Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milicovic: both professed a desire to fill countless body bags as a method to overextend the cost which American policy makers were assumed willing to bear during possible and actual interventions. The proof to the validity of their assumptions is the statement by General Wesley Clark, "you don't want to lose aircraft... and the people ask 'How long can this go on?'".³⁴

Herein lies the problem for the politicians; since war can be rationally limited by the means authorized for its prosecution and in some ways can imitate a business deal, then why does limited war still require the national passions be inflamed? Clausewitz considered this dilemma when he eloquently wrote, "consequently, it would be an obvious fallacy to imagine war between civilized peoples as resulting merely from a rational act on the part of their governments and to conceive of war as gradually ridding itself of passion."³⁵ Here Clausewitz is referring to the point that a war must still be fought between the two sides, and the victor cannot be declared just because one side has an algebraic advantage in physical forces.

³⁴ General Wesley Clark, *Parameters*, 8.

³⁵ Clausewitz, On War, 76.

Feelings and passions, at the governmental, national, and soldier level, must be factored into the balance of forces.

Post Cold War American conflicts have typically lacked the national passions that were inherent to early 20th century wars. This lack of natural passion by American military forces during the initial stages of combat will frequently exhibit the cool and rational behavior that Clausewitz warns against. Only after the introduction of the dangers inherent in combat will American service members build the passions equal to their belligerent. This can be a distinct disadvantage in the early stages of any conflict. In theory then, American forces must be superior to their belligerents in some other moral factor if they are to remain supreme on the battlefield.

Military virtues should not be confused with enthusiasm for a cause, as Clausewitz noted: "The need for military virtues becomes greater the more... other factors tend to complicate the war and disperse the forces."³⁶ It is a serious mistake to underrate the professional pride of soldiers who consider themselves part of a guild. The pride and professionalism of American forces is the moral force that is utilized to compensate for the lack of

³⁶ Clausewitz, On War, 188.

enthusiasm and passion during limited conflicts. These virtues are imbued upon its members through history, traditions, leadership, and training. The cohesion, and trust of service members who have been steadily trained under high stress and exacting requirements provides them a positive moral strength.³⁷ Routine training leading to brisk, precise, and reliable leadership reduces the friction of war and is indispensable at the lowest levels.³⁸ It is these military virtues that American servicemen must use to balance the national passions and enthusiasm a belligerent may exude.

Since American politicians have limited the number of casualties allowable in order to obtain a specific aim, during the initial stages of conflict it is imperative not to exceed the cost designated. Early setbacks by American forces would force the government to decide whether, to discard the intervention as cost prohibitive, or increase the actual physical losses in our armed services that America is willing to bear. This is the real reason that casualty aversion is an important consideration in the initial strategic and operational planning for military intervention.

³⁷ Mark Shields, "Civiliandom could learn a lot from Young Americans in Uniform", *Fredricksburg Free Lance-Star*, March 19, 2001.

³⁸ Clausewitz, On War, 153.

Practical effects upon Strategic Decisions

[So] statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve... which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy.

Clausewitz³⁹

Force-protection fetishism encourages military half-measures directed against symptoms rather than sources of international political stability.

Dr. Jeffrey Record⁴⁰

Strategy is the starting point for all military decisionmaking. At the strategic level, Washington's policy makers determine national policies and establish how to apply national power (military, economic, diplomatic, or informational) towards their furtherance. In considering the diplomatic/military options to further policy, there are two competing ideas: Diplomacy and coercive statecraft.⁴¹

Diplomacy entails the traditionally negotiated agreement between two or more parties that settles a dispute through a peaceful resolution of differences. Failure of diplomatic solutions is traditionally seen as the precursor for armed conflict. Coercive statecraft, however, is the use of, or threat of recourse towards,

³⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 608.

⁴⁰ Record, "Force Protection Fetishism."

⁴¹ Nathan, "The Rise & Decline of Coercive Statecraft," *Proceedings*, 60.

military power to force a nation or other entity into accepting a diplomatic proposal to which it would not normally agree upon. This coercion implies a willingness and ability to use military action to force a second party to accept the rejected proposal.

It is important to understand that the willingness to use force must be viewed in the eyes of the belligerent, since it is their perception of the United State's willingness to fight that creates the coercion to negotiate. This concept is deeply imbedded in American history, and it is one prime reason for the U. S. Navy's forward presence mission. The sailing of the Great White Fleet between 1907 and 1909 was a method for President Theodore Roosevelt to tell the world that America "carried a big stick". This action gave Roosevelt the credibility necessary should he need to utilize coercive statecraft. Since the U.S. is currently the lone superpower, it only needs to prove in the mind of potential belligerents that it has the determination to use its armed forces and bear any attendant cost in order to utilize coercive statecraft.

The willingness of the United States to fight therefore remains of prime importance when policy makers and strategists consider how to influence another nation or non-state actor. As previously discussed, it is not the

determination of the country to fight, but rather the ability of Washington's political leadership to risk fighting that is the major concern. In a crisis one of the early and vital strategic decisions will entail what means (military forces, capabilities, and limitations) will be allocated to the operational commander to use during a possible conflict. When weighing the cost-benefit analysis, strategists can reduce the cost in lives by three ways: do not utilize military forces; if committed, limit the risk to forces employed; or limit the duration of the mission.

The choices available to decision makers in limiting risk to service members are all negative influences upon combat operations. In order to limit casualties, the strategists can reduce risk by restricting the types of forces employed, placing restrictive control measures upon them, applying weapons restrictions, and specifying rules of engagement (ROE). Each of these controls degrades a military force's ability to conduct operations at maximum efficiency. The American armed forces are built, equipped, and trained to defeat adversaries in two distant, overlapping major theater wars (MTW).⁴² The doctrine and

⁴² Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America. N.p., 1998.

systems employed are designed to maximize the synergy created by attacking an enemy using multiple options to overwhelm the foe's decision-making ability. Each individual attack (ground, air, electronic, etc.) is designed to support and maximize the effectiveness of another dissimilar attack upon the opponent; this is combined arms in its essence.⁴³ When restrictions are placed upon the types of attack and weapons, then the effectiveness of multiple systems authorized for use is also decreased.

Limiting the duration of an operation on foreign soil by placing self imposed time restrictions vice determining what *ends* must be met before military forces are withdrawn can be a strategic disaster. It provides the enemy with a clear determination of how long they must persevere in order to out last the US forces employed against them. By placing a limit to the time available to a commander to accomplish his mission, strategic decision makers can make the mission more difficult than it should be. Aggressive commanders who find themselves short on time may be tempted to try quick fixes or risky operations, while other commanders may limit operations, not willing to lose lives

⁴³ MCDP 1, Warfighting, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1997), 94-95.

when the operation nears its arbitrary time limit. History has born out that combat has a timeline all its own, unique to each conflict. To attempt to force the conflict to go by a speed it will not support is to cause more difficulty for a military force than necessary.⁴⁴

Therefore, casualty aversion can cause the strategic decision maker significant difficulties. By causing a question considering the willingness to use military force, coercive statecraft has been negated as an available diplomatic tool.⁴⁵ If the decision to commit military forces has been made, then the options available to reduce friendly casualties will most likely have a negative effect upon the effectiveness of the forces employed. These options generally hinder rather than assist in accomplishing the furtherance of national aims, through military action.

⁴⁴ Clausewitz, On War, 598.

⁴⁵ Maj. Charles K. Hyde USAF, "Casualty Aversion Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military Officers."

Effects upon Operational/Tactical decisions

Avoidance of bloodshed, then, should not be taken as an act of policy if our main concern is to preserve our forces... [a] great many generals have failed through this mistaken assumption.⁴⁶

Clausewitz

The paramount lesson learned from Operation Allied Force is that the well-being of our people must remain our first priority.⁴⁷

U.S. Department of Defense

Since casualty aversion in this paper deals with military forces, it can be expected that the greatest effects will be at the lowest levels. Surprisingly though, the effects are not always as bad as feared. US forces in the 1990's have exhibited the ability to comply with the desires of the National Command Authority to reduce casualties with a variety of tactical adaptations. The techniques used to focus on the reduction of casualties have worked; however, mission attainment has met with various levels of success. Two different tactical solutions to an identical situation illustrate this.

The initial US element in NATO's Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR) was Task Force Falcon, commanded by Brig Gen.

⁴⁶ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 98.

⁴⁷ Department of Defense, *Lessons Learned from Kosovo, After Action Review*, URL: www.defenselink.mil/specials/lessons, accessed 5 January 2001.

Bantz Craddock, Assistant Division Commander for the 1st Infantry Division. In an interview conducted by *Army Magazine*, he was asked "What is going to be the measure of success for the individual soldier?" His answer reveals the attitude and eventually the tactics the Army would apply to the Balkans: "Force protection is the first thing. We have to keep everybody safe".⁴⁸ This belief that force protection supercedes mission attainment is not new to the Balkan area. An Army lieutenant reinforced this idea to a class of West Point cadets in referring to his experiences in neighboring Bosnia: "I tell my men every day there is nothing there worth one of them dying for... because minimizing—really prohibiting casualties is the top-priority mission I have been given by my battalion commander."⁴⁹

In order to improve the safety of US forces, the Army has undergone its largest engineering operation since the Vietnam War. "Fortress Bondesteel" is the name of the US Army's fortified encampment in Kosovo: by both name and appearance, it embodies the very ideal of casualty aversion. An impressive fortress, it now protects the US

⁴⁸ Bantz J. Craddock, Brig. Gen. USA, "Kosovo—The Task Force Commander's Viewpoint," *ARMY MAGAZINE*, Sept 1999.

⁴⁹ Tom Bowman, "Debating a no-casualty order," *The Boston Globe*, A21, April 9, 2000.

KFOR from the populace it is assigned to protect. From this fortress, US Army patrols are sent out throughout the US sector to enforce the peace, but return within its protective walls upon the conclusion of each mission.

In contrast to the tactic of fortification, US Marines utilized a decentralized approach to the same problems within Kosovo. LtCol Bruce Gundy, Commanding Officer of Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 8th Marines (BLT 3/8), believed "we quickly realized force protection cannot be paramount. First and foremost is the mission."⁵⁰ Once his battalion was established within its assigned area in a Forward Operating Base, 3/8 deployed its forces into company-sized sectors to allow for a continued visual presence within the civilian populace. LtCol Gundy believed he would fail in his mission if "we isolated ourselves in adopting a fortress mentality." This belief led to the small unit tactics of constant patrolling by light infantry forces with the ability to provide rapid reinforcement by mechanized reaction forces should any patrols be attacked. Aggressive patrolling against the guerilla forces and attacking them with overwhelming firepower once they were identified and located provided

⁵⁰ Bruce Gundy, LtCol USMC, "Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol 83 No. 11, Nov 1999, 44.

the required force protection. With each successful engagement at the small unit level, the risk to US forces became smaller. LtCol Gundy summarized both his risk assessment and philosophy on SSC with the statement:

[H]aving well-trained individual Marines who can shoot strait and be prepared to immediately and relentlessly pursue any attack with overwhelming force can only minimize risk. Each time an attacker was killed...a step toward putting society back together was made.⁵¹

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE may provide the military with fertile ground for an analysis of techniques, tactics, and procedures from which mission accomplishment vs. force protection can be measured. However, this operation is still being conducted and as such the data available is preliminary and the long term effects cannot be measured yet. This does not preclude the postulation of possible branches and sequels that US forces may encounter in the near term future, nor does it inhibit the early exploration of possible solutions and conclusions

⁵¹ LtCol Bruce Gundy, "Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment," 45.

Implications for the future

For the greater part of the last two decades, members of the armed services have belabored their belief that if only the politicians would have kept out of their affairs in Vietnam the US would have won. This mythical *mantra* has been repeated enough to be accepted as "truth" by many in uniform. This belief, right or wrong, may end up being the best weapon combat leaders have in combating the negative effects of casualty aversion at the operational and tactical levels of war. In considering the implications of casualty aversion for the future, both observed and possible considerations must be identified.

At the political (strategic) level, US policy makers must understand that politics is about people. The western fascination with high technology cannot answer the root problems that cause civil unrest throughout the world. Politicians must determine what is the policy end state that is desired. A careful, rational analysis of the costs and benefits of military actions should determine both, if the mission is worth the expected cost (in lives), and can the military reasonably be expected to accomplish national

aims.⁵² If the decision is made to employ military forces, political leaders must concentrate on the end state desired and not the high tech weapons to be used. Limitations placed upon the armed forces should also focus on the ends and not the means. Political leaders must understand that the more restrictions and limitations emplaced upon a committed military, the lower the chances for success. In order to move the balance of power back into the favor of US forces, more assets must be employed to counterbalance the restrictions and limitations placed upon the military; this then, can lead to escalation.

As discussed earlier, restraints and constraints placed upon the military are both in keeping with the theory of war, and are rational and justifiable in the context of limited aims and means. The political leadership must understand, though, that each limitation becomes yet another obstacle that must be overcome if an objective is to be achieved. This is in addition to any adversary that must be subdued. In the next decade it is improbable that any conventionally armed force can

⁵² Phillip Crawl, "The Strategists Short Catechism: Six questions without answers," in The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987, ed. Lt. Col. Harry R. Borowski (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1988). Note: This line of thought is similar to the "six questions" that form the basis of Crawl's lectures at military academies in the late 1970's.

militarily match-up against that of the U.S. Therefore, any failures of military operations will most likely be due to poor usage of US power.

The implications of casualty aversion for military leaders are greater than that for any other group. Since armed conflict involves physical combat, injury, and death, those who are engaged in the actual fighting have the greatest personal stake in how it occurs. It is the military leadership, and the troops "on the ground", that must live or die with the results of vague policy objectives and poor employment, planning, training, or ill-advised restrictions.

The first and most important action the military can take is to jettison the fallacy that political constraints prevent the armed forces from performing their missions. The role of the services is to achieve political goals through military means. The stated political goals are the driving force for armed commitments and their operations. As such, these have primacy in all strategic, operational, and tactical planning and execution. With rare exceptions military forces have always had to perform their missions under some type of politically restrictive guidance; casualty aversion is just the latest type of limitation to operations.

The military leadership must aggressively fight any perception that force protection is the primary mission. Force protection to the military officer is a means of husbanding forces for use at a later date, not the reason for their existence. If force protection is the number one mission, then why should our forces be committed in a potentially hostile environment? If an enemy is willing to make the effort, and pay the price, he can and will find a way to cause casualties. It is impossible to create perfect protection. The argument for force protection as the number one mission has no logical basis and must be refuted aggressively. Security of forces should be considered a continuing action, not a mission. This is for a variety of reasons, from the humanitarian to the preservation of forced capability. Just as camouflage, hygiene, and planning are constants within the combat zone, security should also be a constant. Military NCO schools and basic officer classes teach and reinforce local security, as this is where it is really found. High quality junior officers and NCO's are the first and best line of defense for physical security of deployed troops.

While the leadership reinforces that force protection is not the mission, it should also articulate the reality that mission accomplishment supercedes all other

requirements. If service members die in combat, it is regrettable; if they die in vain because the unit failed to accomplish its mission, then that is a tragedy. Passive or unprepared leadership will lead to mission failure. In the USS *Harlan County* incident, a unit unprepared (mentally) to accomplish its mission caused the US to redefine its policy in regards to Haiti.

The military must also continue to try and focus the media onto the mission and its accomplishment. The media's current fascination with high tech weaponry and its supposed surgical strike capability plays into the misconception that combat can be bloodless. Consequently, when they are briefed on body counts and numbers of equipment destroyed the services are feeding the casualty aversion machine. What the military should be guiding the media towards is the steps taken to accomplish the assigned mission. With the focus put on the political aims to be obtained, the politicians will be given additional freedom from the casualty aversion anchor that must be shed. The military must inform the American people, through the media, that by accomplishing the mission casualties can be reduced and those taken will not be in vain.

Additionally, the military must cease talking about redeployment dates. Armed conflicts frequently take a long

time to achieve their political aims. Britain has had a significant history of conducting SSC operations, and most of the successful ones have been measured in multiple years and not months. This will require a fundamental change in the way the US assesses combat. Current Weinberger-Powell doctrine is to use decisive force to quickly accomplish assigned tasks and redeploy to CONUS for further use. This will not be feasible in most SSC's. A cursory look at current SSC operations (Sinai, SOUTHERN WATCH, Bosnia) indicates that they are, or will be, long term deployments before national aims are successfully achieved.

Some authors, most notably Colonel David Hackworth, USA (Ret) and Colonel Ralph Peters, USA (Ret) have expressed concerns over losing the "warrior ethos" by becoming casualty averse. Although an alarming prospect, this is a remote possibility. To believe that US forces would lose their "warrior ethos" would be to disregard the reasons American join the military today. The young men and women who join the service today are more competitive in the civilian job market than their predecessors. Military advertising and recruiters focus on those intangible qualities of leadership, adventure, and esprit de corps to compete with the higher salaries offered by the civilian job market. It is these very qualities, coupled

with the professionalism of the officers and staff non-commissioned officers, that will prevent the force from losing its "warrior ethos." What is more probable is that if casualty aversion leads to passive leadership, the military could lose those professionals that it requires to build the "warrior ethos" into the recruits. In the fight to retain the warrior values necessary for a productive military force, the focus of effort must be on retaining the boldness and aggressiveness of the junior leaders who will be the decision makers on the ground during future conflicts.

Any consideration of military implications would be insufficient if it did not take into account the enemy reaction. It is not hard to determine what most antagonists to the US will use as their first course of action. Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milocivec both professed a desire to send more body bags to Dover AFB than the American public, hence president, could stomach. This tactic will most likely continue in the future. It is highly probable that antagonists will become more efficient in their methods of attacking US service members. Enemy forces can be expected to single out US personnel within coalition forces for attack. Ambushes will become more sophisticated and lethal. Enemy forces will not shy away

from enticing US forces into a trap, and can be expected to offer vital targets as bait in an attempt to kill US service members. News media and cameras can be anticipated to be present at attacks that have a high probability of success. To the wise commander, it is obvious that the critical vulnerability of the US is the number of casualties the political leadership perceives it can accept. This is where the military can expect to see the enemy's focus of effort.

The greatest implication for military leadership is in the research, development, and acquisition of military hardware.⁵³ The perception of a necessity to reduce casualties provides the military arms industry with an unlimited ability to sell new high technology equipment and weapons. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), ground robotic vehicles, and smart munitions that are launched from great standoff can seem like a panacea for reducing casualties. Undoubtedly, they will be marketed towards the military as new ways to reduce casualties. This is a trap, for as long as there has been war new weapons have been procured only

⁵³ Note: For further discussion of the impact casualty aversion may have on research and development of military equipment, and the circular logic that can occur from this path see: Charles Knight, Lutz Unterseheler, and Carl Conetta in "Military Research and Development after the Second Gulf War;" Harvey Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro in "Casualties, Technology, and America's Future Wars;" and Maj. Richard A. Lacquement Jr. US Army, "The Casualties Myth and the Technology Trap."

to improve the ability to wage war. To buy a weapon because it makes war safer is illogical, and can equip the US military with weapons which are ill suited for combat operations.⁵⁴ The key component of successful SSC operations is military presence within the objective area. The presence of a soldier on a street corner is vastly more effective to establishing peace than the threat of a high tech missile coming from out of nowhere to blast away guerrillas or other belligerents. Additionally the use of high tech standoff weapons and robotics directly counteracts the boldness that is desired and needed in junior leaders to successfully accomplish SSC operations.

It should be understood that achieving political policy goals is the real objective of all military operations. Politicians have both the right and the requirement to be active participants in decisions that affect military operations. The key ingredient to success on the modern battlefield has been and will continue to be the highly trained leaders and service members who will be employed at the small unit level. It is the continuing actions of well-trained troops that will provide not only mission accomplishment but, consequently, force protection

⁵⁴ Major Richard Lacquement Jr. US Army, "The Casualties Myth and the Technology Trap," *Army Magazine*, November 1997.

also. We must seek to gain and maintain the initiative at all levels during combat, and as such must refrain from becoming separated by a fortress from the very people a committed force professes to protect. As General Colin Powell commented just before the presidential election of 2000:

My philosophy remains what it has always been—our troops deserve to know and understand what they are fighting for, and they need to be given the military resources and political support to prevail quickly and decisively. Such action will usually minimize casualties. Casualties occur in war, and soldiers know that is a risk they take when they put on the uniform. I also know from experience that it is a philosophy shared by [Vice Presidential candidate] Dick Cheney. The no-casualty approach is not a military strategy. It is a political strategy used when a political judgment is made that the American people will not support the loss of their GIs for the goals being pursued.

*General Colin L. Powell, 2000
Remarks made 4 months prior to becoming
United States Secretary of State⁵⁵*

⁵⁵ General Colin Powell, *Wall Street Journal*.

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LtCol Ash published this piece in the *Aerospace Power Chronicles* to tie together the thoughts of three separate articles published within this edition. This article is extremely short, less than 500 words, and does not provide any real in-depth analysis. The only new thoughts it addresses are the responsibilities of the media in casualty aversion, although these ideas are not fully developed.

Aspin, Les, Chairman House Armed Services Committee, "Role of U.S. Military in Post-Cold War World," address before the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, September 21, 1992.

In this address, Congressman Aspin openly debated the strengths and weaknesses of the General Colin Powell "all or nothing" camp and the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's "Limited Objectives" camp's views of military intervention. He proposed that the United States would begin to gravitate towards the "Limited Objectives" camp and would utilize primarily airpower and precision weapons to compel adversaries to bend to U.S. political objectives. Congressman Aspin also believed that the U.S. should decide to use force on a case-by-case basis and not by a strict litmus test. This speech is significant in that Congressman Aspin would later become the Secretary of Defense for President Clinton during his first term, and his speech predicts the actions of the Clinton administration in its foreign policy and military interventions during the 1990's.

Boot, Max, "NO-RISK WAR: Will Bush Bury 'Bodybag Syndrome'?" Editorial. *Wall Street Journal*, September 11, 2000.

Max Boot is the editorial features editor of *The Wall Street Journal*. In this editorial, he puts forth the argument that casualty aversion is not unique to the Clinton administration; rather, he postulates that it is endemic within the Pentagon and both political parties. Most of the editorial asserts that there is a misreading of the American people's willingness to accept casualties in combat. Boot quickly summarizes conflicts from Vietnam to Kosovo, and purports that each administration lost its nerve and withdrew troops prior to the American people losing their will.

Bowman, Tom, "Debating a no-casualty order," *The Boston Globe*, A21, April 9, 2000.

A short article that provides facts, but no analysis. Due to the absence of citations, facts identified in this article are used if mentioned in other separate sources. Among those provided are examples of techniques used to limit danger to US military personnel during operations in the Balkan states. The article quotes a frequently mentioned young Lieutenant as he discussed force protection

with US Military Academy cadets. The majority of the article is designed to inform the public that the military is debating the morality and professionalism of no-casualty orders.

Clark, Wesley K. General USA, "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead", *Parameters*, Vol. 29, No. 4, (Winter 1999/2000), 2-14.

This article provides a brief glimpse into the decision making processes of the commander of U.S. and NATO forces during the 1999 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo. While the majority of the article deals with the future of NATO, there are a couple of paragraphs that concern Kosovo and casualty aversion.

Clausewitz, Carl Von, ed., *On War*, trans. Peter Paret, Michael Howard. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Often considered the premier theoretician on warfare, Carl Von Clausewitz wrote *On War* during the 19th century and it remains relevant. Of interest for this topic are Books One, "On the Nature of War"; Two, "On the Theory of War"; Book Three, "On Strategy in General"; and Book Eight, "War Plans". His usefulness as a reference for this topic are two-fold: not only does he provide solid ideas concerning the relationship between combat and politics, but Clausewitz is also the most frequently quoted theorist by US policy makers. Although his thoughts on limited war are by his own admission 'immature,' they still provide a solid theoretical basis to consider the relationship between the military and its government. In Book Two, Clausewitz spends significant time in describing the attributes of professional armies and soldiers. This provides both support and contrast to the views of retired U.S. Army Colonel Ralph Peters. Book Eight is the most important book for the non-theorist to read. It is easier to master than the notoriously difficult Book One, and considers the question "How to win the war?" Chapters 3, 5, 7, and 8 all pertain specifically to limited war/aims. In Book 8, Clausewitz brings forward the concept of limited war as a business deal. This thought has clear implications for the student of post Cold War strategy.

Clinton, William Jefferson, President of the United States, "A Just and Necessary War," *New York Times*, May 23, 1999.

In this article, President Clinton provides the American people with the justification for the armed intervention in Kosovo, OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Many writers and analysts have labeled the thoughts espoused in this letter as the "Clinton Doctrine." His justification for ALLIED FORCE is steeped in Wilsonian liberalism and provides few measurable indices for conflict termination.

Craddock, Bantz J., Brig. Gen. USA, "Kosovo – The Task Force Commander's Viewpoint," Interview by staff in *Army Magazine*, September 1999.

An interview that provides a commander's view of the problems of Military Operations Other than War, (MOOTW) in Bosnia. However, it provided little insight into the topic of this paper other than verifying other sources that indicated for the US Army in Kosovo and Bosnia: force protection was more important than mission attainment. The rest of the interview is the standard military magazine interview in which BG Craddock praises every member of his command.

Crowl, Phillip, "The Strategists Short Catechism: Six Questions without Answers", in *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987*, ed. Lt. Col. Harry R Borowski, Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1988.

Crowl believed that before a strategist commences war, takes action that leads to war, undertakes a wartime campaign, or ends a war in which he is already engaged in, he must ask the following six questions: What is it about? Is military strategy tailored to meet the national political objective? What are the limits of military power in support of national policy? What are the alternatives? How strong is the home front? What have I overlooked? These six questions are similar to those posed by the Powell Doctrine, however; are not as prescriptive (i.e. decisive force must be used, there must be an end state, the US must fight quickly).

Dunlap, Charles J. Jr. Colonel, USAF, "Organizational Changes and the New Technologies of War," URL: usa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE98/Dunlap98 accessed 13 September 2000.

The first 10 pages of this paper describe Dunlap's assertion that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is currently underway. The precursor to this RMA was the microchip, which has simultaneously increased the capability to compute and reduced the size of the computer. With these improvements, the military has developed equipment such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), precision guided munitions, cruise missiles, and remote control vehicles, all of which have reduced or eliminated the requirement for soldiers to expose themselves to danger. Dunlap postulates that this RMA requires services to rethink their reason for existence, as robots replace pilots and high-tech strike missiles render amphibious operations obsolete. Some of these considerations include thoughts on the use of space for combat. The chapter titled "Casualty-Aversion and the Warrior Ethos," brings together some thoughts on casualty aversion and how high tech weapons conform to the American belief in expending things (ammunition) and not people in war. This chapter concludes with a warning concerning buying weapons solely for their ability to protect American servicemen, vice their ability to accomplish the mission. The last third of the article concerns the possibility of increasing the use of reserves/National Guard and civilian contractors in both support and combat support roles. The author labels these people "quasi-

warriors” and takes the time to explain that although important, they should never be mistaken or replace true military personnel. This publication provides some interesting thoughts on the directions technology can take the military. Dunlap ultimately provided a fairly balanced view of the tension that exists between technology and traditional military professionals.

Eikenberry, Karl W. LTC USA, “Casualty Limitation and Military Doctrine,” *Army*, February 1994.

This essay considers the effects of casualty aversion on the military. Eikenberry’s thesis is that casualty aversion should be outside the military realm and remain in that of the politician. It begins with a brief history of casualty aversion, starting with King Pyrrhus and his costly victories and concluding with Israel’s manpower constraints during the Arab/Israeli wars of 1973. He takes the time to clearly demonstrate that politicians are driven increasingly towards casualty aversion as the conflicts become more and more limited in nature. In his discussions on the political costs of high casualties, he considers both total and limited war, but surprisingly does not even mention the limitation of means by the politicians as a method to reduce casualties. This raises the one failure of this article: it does not get to the complaint of casualty aversion, namely that politicians meddle in what has traditionally been a military concern by limiting the options of the military for political reasons. Despite this one shortfall, it is well written, blending theorists such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu with modern military doctrine and current problems.

Eikenberry, Karl W. Col. USA, “Take No Casualties,” *Parameters*, Vol 26, no. 2 (Summer 1996).

This article is an adaptation of Eikenberry’s article in Army (February 1994), “Casualty Limitation and Military Doctrine.” The difference between the two appears to be mostly an improvement in the proofs he uses to make his points. Some new information has been added to freshen the previous piece, but such does not change the overall direction of it. One highlight is the strong statement “it was politically risky, if not suicidal, to preside over any limited conflict that could not be won quickly, with relatively few casualties.” This statement provided a good starting point for developing a working definition of casualty aversion.

Field Manual (FM) 100-5. *Operations*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army. June 1993.

This Field Manual is the basic tactical and operational level doctrinal field manual for the U.S. Army.

Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1. *Operational Terms and Graphics*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army. September 1997.

This FM has also been accepted by the United States Marine Corps, and is titled MCRP 5-2A. It provides specific definitions for military terms and acts as a dictionary for military terminology.

Feaver, Peter D. and Christopher Gelpi. "A Look at...Casualty Aversion: How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer." *Washington Post*, 7 November 1999.

This article is a frequently cited source in the study of casualty aversion. One of the authors, Peter Feaver, was a member of the National Security Council staff during part of the Somalia conflict. The thesis of this newspaper essay is that the US citizenry will support military operations, and subsequently military casualties, provided they perceive a purpose for American involvement. The authors provide facts to support their analysis that the major causative factor in American popular support for military involvement in Small Scale Contingencies is leadership from the political establishment, and especially the President.

Gandy, Bruce A. LtCol USMC, Maj William M. Jurney, Capt John R. Anderson, Capt David Eiland, "Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment", *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol 83, no. 11 (November 1999): 44-52

This is a series of articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* which were written by the battalion commander and his company commanders of Battalion Landing Team 1/8 concerning their deployment on peacekeeping in Kosovo as members of KFOR from June-July 1999. These provide insight into the mission analysis, threat analysis, and risk assessment of a commander who was faced with accomplishing a difficult mission in a casualty averse environment. They provide important and thought provoking questions to consider when determining the affects of casualty aversion to the tactical leader. The tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized by the commander as he balanced force protection with mission accomplishment provide future commanders with one possible solution to future problems. In summary, all the authors agree that aggressive, high quality, junior leadership can reduce risk to a manageable level, but the nature of war by itself will always include the risk of casualties to the combat soldier.

Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor, General USMC (Ret), *The Generals' War*, Boston MA: Little, Brown and Company 1995.

This book focuses on the interaction between the civilian and military decision makers during the Gulf War. Although the Gulf War was a Major Theater War and not a Small Scale Contingency, the book is extremely relevant for this MMS paper because it provides a careful examination of US strategic decisionmaking. The current Vice President, Dick Cheney, and Secretary of State, Colin Powell were both central figures during the Gulf War (albeit in different positions).

Colin Powell's "Powell Doctrine" has been both applauded and chastised in academic circles for its reliance on clear objectives, overwhelming force, and exit strategies. Both the decisions made during the Gulf War and the thought processes that were used are important when considering what US foreign policy might look like under the George W. Bush presidency. An additional insight that this book allows is that of the general feelings and beliefs of the senior leadership in the armed forces. General Trainor was able to impart throughout the book how the personal and professional beliefs of the general (i.e. flag) officers during Desert Storm were learned as captains and majors in the jungles of Vietnam

Hyde, Charles K. Maj. USAF, "Casualty Aversion Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military Officers," *Aerospace Power Chronicles*, (Summer 2000).

The majority of this article deals with proofs that casualty aversion within the American people is a myth; rather, in reality the only groups that are casualty averse are the military and civilian elites. This information, although good background information, was irrelevant to this MMS paper since it is outside its scope. The last three pages of this article are exceedingly strong, though. Maj. Hyde brings up the concepts of coercive statecraft and the need to dispel the myth of casualty aversion. There is also an implication that military leaders have used casualty aversion to strengthen the military's power to determine national policy and strategy. The concern that casualty averse officers within the military stifle boldness and initiative is an area that has been raised by more than one writer. Hyde also considers whether casualty aversion is different within the various services. Comparing mission vs. force protection in the Kosovo operation, he notes that Marine commanders and Army commanders had different philosophies and subsequently issued different orders. This section begins to delve into the "warrior ethos" that many others on casualty aversion have discussed. Unfortunately, he did not fully explore this topic.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, N.p., 1998.

The National Military Strategy provides the foundation for how the United States intends to support the National Security Strategy through military force. It is the capstone document that provides guidance for training, equipping, employing, and procuring weapon systems and personnel. It also provides a brief analysis of the current world security situation and prospects for change in the near-term future.

Kitfield, James, "Neither Total War nor Total Victory," URL: Govexec.com/dailyfed/0799/07269962 accessed 28 August 2000.

This article covers some conclusions that may be drawn from OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo in 1999. It is of limited use for this paper in that it only peripherally notes the phenomenon of casualty aversion. There are implications that President Clinton's decision to rule out ground troops caused both difficulties within the NATO coalition as well as

prevented the allied force from accomplishing its mission. However, the author never does make the case for this implication.

Knight, Charles, Lutz Unterseher, and Carl Conetta, "Reflections on Information War, Casualty Aversion, and Military Research and Development After the Gulf War and the Demise of the Soviet Union," excerpted from "Military Research and Development after the Second Gulf War" in Smit, Grin, and Veronkov, *Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a changing World*, Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992.

This paper takes casualty aversion into a different direction: specifically, what can be done in response to this phenomenon? The authors contend that research and development will provide the American military with the technological answers to prevent casualties. Although most of the arguments are easily discounted by a thorough knowledge of the subject of war, these same views have been postulated in other works and reflect an American faith in the ability of technology to overcome any problem. They are also very persuasive to someone who is looking for a way to prevent American servicemember casualties in war. The article therefore was useful in that it provided an argument that must be considered, even though it may be illogical.

Lacquement, Richard A. Jr. Maj USA, "The Casualties Myth and the Technology Trap," *Army*, November 1997.

Contrary to the title, this article has nothing to do with technology vs. casualty aversion. In reality, it is little more than an open editorial to Army leadership that casualty aversion is a myth and ground forces are still of utility in the post Cold-War era. Classified as complete opinion, with little new ground covered, it was of little value to this study.

Larson, Eric V., *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for US Military Operations*, MR-726-RC, Santa Monica CA: The Rand Corp., 1996.

The majority of articles within this bibliography refer to this article and its attendant research. Mr. Larson examined World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Panama, and Somalia. Through his research he established a relationship between casualties, public support, and the merits of the operation. Through his analysis he has come to the conclusion that there are four major variables in public support for combat and the willingness to bear a high cost in casualties. He also concludes that support for combat operations changes with the altering of conditions on both the battlefield and in the capital. In his conclusions, he clearly states his thesis that those who ascribe declining public support for military operations to casualty aversion are incorrect. Rather, it is the confusion created by complex political situations in areas with dubious national interests that causes low public support for such commitments. His analysis of historical conflicts is detailed and presented in an easy to comprehend manner. Overall, an

extremely important document to read for background knowledge on this topic.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, *Warfighting*, Washington DC: Department of the Navy. June 1997.

This doctrinal publication is considered the capstone document for Marine Corps doctrine. It provides general information on how to conduct operations and planning for operations. This publication does not cover the techniques, tactics, and procedures for military operations, but rather, it covers the art of war.

Mortensen, Daniel R., "An Ethos of Casualty Sensitivity," *Aerospace Power Chronicles*, (Summer 2000).

This article is an Op-ed piece published in the Vortices (editorial) section of the *Aerospace Power Chronicles*. It deals with casualty sensitivity within the American military during World War II. In this article casualty sensitivity relates to the American cultural sensitivity to direct casualties, friendly and belligerent. The author uses the American predilection to use indirect fire vice infantry battles to produce enemy casualties as proof that Americans are squeamish about seeing casualties. It has minimal relevance to the topic of this paper since it considers a different aspect of casualty sensitivity than that developed here.

Mueller, John E., *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America Inc., 1983.

This book published shortly after Vietnam focuses on the relationship between presidents and public opinion. Even though the book was written during the Cold War, it remains relevant in its limited view of the interrelationships between the president and the American people. It specifically looks at how the two interrelate in the process of strategic decision-making during wartime. The author takes into account historical data from World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. In the later portions of the book, he asserts that the president is both effected by and can affect public opinion during periods of international crisis. This book provided background information relative to the interrelationships between political decisions and public opinion, and as such was instrumental in validating the assumption that it is the perception of public opinion that is important to the President of the United States when he is making decisions concerning the employment of military forces into combat.

Mueller, Karl P., "Politics, Death, and Mortality in US Foreign Policy," *Aerospace Power Chronicles*, (Summer 2000).

A strong article that considers many facets of casualty aversion as it affects American statecraft. The author initially debunks the myth that the American people will not support a war that includes high casualties. His main point is that casualty aversion is a noble justification to the reality that war has become less brutal and gruesome. The belief that warfare is less horrible for their participants

is at odds with most of the literature published, and is a major weakness of the piece, and if false would render many of his suppositions ineffective. With the improvements in weaponry, medicine, and mechanization, the harsh and short life of the typical combatant has been improved significantly. This improvement in quality of life during combat has also been realized within the civilian populace. Since modern war is not the brutal hell that it was in the 18th century, future wars will be less and less horrible, hence the morality of casualty aversion. The author makes a distinction between whether war *should* and *can* be less horrific. The second major point of the piece considers the timidity with which America has waged war in the late 20th century. The author uses the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and decries it as a national military strategy that will limit the nation's ability to be involved in war when it is in the best interest to do so. His summary calls for American political leadership to use a moral compass and lead the American people, vice utilizing popular opinion to determine the course of US policy.

Myers, Gene, *Joint Aerospace Power: A New National Strategy, Part II: Bombs or Boots*, The Eaker Institute, 1998.

This article is aptly named "*Bombs or Boots*." Its central thesis is that traditional American strategy considers land combat as the decisive element of military force, which consequently understates the realities of airpower. Its utility for this paper is limited to an extreme argument that casualty aversion requires American strategy to shift towards airpower and away from land power as the decisive style of combat. Even though this argument is flawed, it has been mentioned in both military and civilian articles, hence it is significant. As such, it must be considered within this paper.

Nathan, James, "The Rise and Decline of Coercive Statecraft," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1995.

This article focuses on the relationship between diplomacy and military force. It uses the theories of Carl von Clausewitz to validate Nathan's opinions. Through an assessment of post World War II conflicts he explains how diplomacy without credible force equals disaster for statesmen. Later in it, Nathan takes the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine to task by implying that it is too restrictive for proper and efficient diplomacy. The casualty aversion phenomenon is mentioned in passing as it relates to a basic weakness when American statesmen negotiate with foreign governments. This article provides excellent background information into some of the basics of diplomacy. Since diplomacy is one of the pillars of strategic power, it is a useful document for this research topic.

Peters, Ralph, C, Colonel USA (Ret), *Fighting for the Future*, Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books, 1999.

This book is of limited use for the research of casualty aversion. Peter's purpose is to scare American military and civilian leadership into changing the structure of

its armed forces. He believes that heavy divisions, billion dollar stealth aircraft, and large fleets of nuclear submarines are irrelevant in strategic equation of the 21st century. Consequently, he recommends a mixture of light and medium forces that are easily deployable while maintaining a large volume of firepower relative to light infantry forces. He describes the future enemy U.S. troops should expect to face as being a mixture of mercenaries and estranged young adults who fight for stateless nations and non-state actors. The five future warriors that he predicts will become America's future foes are all believable and have in some cases shown up on battlefields of the late 1990's. A "fun to read" book that borders on the fringes of reality.

Powell, Colin, General USA (Ret), "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 7 No. 5 (Winter 1992/1993), 32-45.

General Powell was one of the principle guiding forces for American military strategy and doctrine in the 1990's, and is currently serving as Secretary of State under President George W. Bush (2001). This article was written while he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is useful in amplifying and clarifying the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. This doctrine has been the most important American strategic/military thought in the 1990's, since it has been used to justify the use of, refusal to apply, or withdrawal of previously committed, American military forces in a crisis. This paper also brings up some other significant observations: "ambiguity in our enemy's mind is good," and "surgical bombing isn't" are two of the more relevant ones concerning the limitations of military forces as it relates to casualty aversion.

Powell, Colin, General USA (Ret), "No Casualties is Political, not Military," Op-Ed, *Wall Street Journal*, September 14, 2000.

In this Op-ed, General Powell refutes the ascertainment by Max Boot that the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is responsible for a no-casualties doctrine. General Powell states that casualty aversion is a political and not a military strategy.

Record, Jeffrey, "Force Protection Fetishism: Sources, Consequences, and (?) Solutions," *Aerospace Power Journal*, (Summer 2000).

Dr. Record's article is a stinging rebuke of American political leadership and its ability to stomach the use of force to forward national aims. He argues that the Vietnam War taught the current military and civilian leadership the wrong lessons. The result of faulty analysis of the Vietnam War is the nation's current Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which contributes to the fallacy of casualty aversion. This leads Record to the belief that casualty phobia by policy makers necessarily degrades military effectiveness. The proofs of this are strong in the strategic realm, but rather weak in the operational and tactical realms. His summary indicates that he assumes casualty aversion will continue with policy makers and therefore recommends that the United States seek surrogates to shoulder our casualty burden. Record also recommends an increase in the

strength of the Air Force, since it is the only force that policy makers are ready to commit. This article is a thought provoking one, especially since its author is ready to challenge the popular Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. Unfortunately, Record did not provide a stronger summary and recommendation for future policy makers. This oversight weakens the strength of the piece.

Riem, Peter J. Lieutenant Commander, USN, "The USS Harlan County Affair," *Military Review*, July/Aug 1997.

A very well researched article that includes interviews with the major decision makers during the actions of Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group. This essay provides a detailed account of the events that led up to the deployment and retirement of the USS Harlan County in 1993. In conclusion, Riem states that the actions of a tactical commander affected the strategic policies of the nation. To support this conclusion, he includes similar conclusions espoused by senior governmental members who were present during the period.

Sapolsky, Harvey M. and Jeremy Shapiro, "Casualties, Technology, and America's Future Wars," *Parameters*, (Summer 1996).

In this article, the authors begin by postulating that the United States is casualty averse because it can be. As the only nation with the wealth, technology, and desire to reduce the casualties inherent in war, the United States alone can wage war with a casualty averse philosophy. Later in it, they take the stance that casualty aversion is an offshoot of American mistrust of government. They also assert that casualty aversion forces politicians to use military forces only in the most extreme cases, causing a retreat back to the traditional theme of isolationism. It also rambles, and provides little summary and no proposals for fixing the identified problems. In summary, the essay provides some good ideas that are incompletely examined but can stimulate reflection by the reader.

Schwartzkopf, Norman H. General USA (Ret.), *The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero*, New York: Bantam Books, 1992.

An important autobiography from a General who has experienced warfare from the Vietnam War to the Persian Gulf War. His perceptions of what went wrong during the Vietnam War provide insight into the mindset of current policy makers, military and civilian. The chapters that deal with the Persian Gulf War also provide a first hand look into the decision making process of strategists as they grapple with national aims versus heavy casualty estimates. Many of the decisions made by General Schwartzkopf, General Powell, and President George H. W. Bush became precedent for the decision making processes currently used.

Shields, Mark, "Civiliandom could learn a lot from Young Americans in Uniform," *Fredricksburg Free Lance-Star*, March 19, 2001.

This short piece discusses the civil-military gap. It proposes that America has

much to learn about "duty, honor, country" from the military, while the military must be exposed to civilians in order to maintain a healthy civilian influence over the military.

Snyder, Don, Maj. John Nagl, and Maj. Tony Pfaff, "Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century," unpublished, url: accts.org/ethics/snidert.htm accessed on September 13, 2000.

This unpublished article is intended to be used in the instruction of military ethics at the United States Military Academy. It focuses on the moral duties of officers in the 21st century, and some of the ethical dilemma's they are bound to confront. The essay also takes senior leadership within the US Army to task for its acceptance of casualty aversion, with the subsequent failure to focus on mission attainment instead of force protection. This piece spends significant time in considering the ethics junior officers must exhibit, especially when faced with risk and self sacrifice. The paper gives few answers, but raises many questions.

Suro, Roberto, "Zeroing In on "Zero Casualty Syndrome'," Op-Ed, *Washington Post*, 21 August 2000.

This editorial by a staff member of *The Washington Post* implies that by embracing casualty aversion, military leaders have denied themselves the ability to maneuver and thus surprise the enemy. Mr. Suro takes this thought and applies it to President Clinton and his decision to not consider the use of ground troops in the Kosovo campaign. A short piece that draws heavily from publications already researched for this topic.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Memorandum from Paul E. Gallis, Coordinator Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division to Senator William V. Roth, Jr. "Operation Allied Force: Lessons Learned" September 3, 1999.

This document provides background information concerning the strategic policy aims, military aims, and effectiveness of military forces in attaining those aims. It is a preliminary report only; the official report had not been published prior to the completion of research for this MMS project.

Weigley, Russell F., *The American Way of War*, Bloomington IL: Indiana University Press, 1973.

This book provides a detailed examination of the "American Way of War" and how both the Civil War and World War II have shaped American military thought and the American people's perceptions of how war is to be waged. It is a required textbook for Marine Corps Command and Staff students studying, Theory and Nature of War, Strategy and Policy, and as a general Military History primer.

Weinberger, Casper W. Speech presented to National Press Club, 28 November 1984.
Text reprinted in USMC Command and Staff Strategy and Policy Syllabus Vol. I, AY-2000.

This speech introduced the Weinberger Doctrine and its six tests to be applied before military force is to be used in support of national policy. Many scholars have argued this doctrine is the embodiment of casualty aversion, a phenomenon that impacts adversely upon policy and strategy.

White, Robert E. "Haiti: Policy Lost, Policy Regained", URL: www.us.net/cip/cosmos3, accessed 3 January 2001.

The author is a former Ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay who has specialized in Latin American affairs for over 25 years. This paper contained few facts concerning the USS Harlan County incident, but did provide interesting analysis of the strategic ramifications of the tactical decisions made by the Commanding Officer of that vessel. The analysis is provided from both the US and Haitian points of view. As a long time Foreign Service officer, Mr. White provides the historical context necessary to fully grasp the political dynamics of this incident.